---

 

Please heed our warning, and prepare your department for the worse. This can happen anywhere. If you are not trained in RIT, then get trained. If you don't use a Mayday policy, you need to implement one. This training must be continuous. One little class on the RIT concept won't cut it. You must train and train hard. If your personnel can't get it right, then make them do it until they can. When it comes time to save one of your own, you had better have your stuff together, from the Commander down to the Firefighter. I personally feel that Don did not have to die that March day; we were not trained to save him!As I reflect back eight years, I realize how deeply my emotions have been buried. March 8, 1995 while operating at a residence fire my partner fell to the basement and perished. I am just now able to find the courage to have a real conversation about it. This tragedy is and always will be at the forefront of my mind.

I am Battalion Chief Donald Harper, Jr., a 30-year veteran of Consolidated Fire District No. 2 (CFD2) in Northeast Johnson County, Kansas. CFD2 is located in the suburbs of Kansas City; in fact our Northern boundary is Kansas City, Kansas while Kansas City, Missouri is on our east. Covering approximately 18 square miles we are comprised mostly of residential areas with some small commercial and office complexes. Utilizing 65 employees and a small contingent of volunteer firefighters we provide fire protection, Basic Life Support and have a specialized trench rescue program. There are three stations and one administrative building, our north and south stations house an engine company and quint or ladder company while our central station has a single engine company. Assigned to each of our 3 battalions are a Battalion Chief, 3 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, 5 Apparatus Operators and 9 Firefighters.

March 8, 1995 began as any other day, coffee, station duties and the normal hubbub of station life. Our department responds to approximately 3500 alarms in the course of a year with 20 to 30 working structure fires. When the radio announced the residence fire at 5706 Lamar we reacted as all of you do, we were pumped! It seemed like forever but we finally had a chance to do the job that we love, not just the public relations stuff or the EMS calls.

The fire was a quick 3 blocks from the station and as we hurried with our gear the Battalion Chief went on scene and established command. He sized up light smoke from the chimney area of a two-story frame residence. My engine was next with, Firefighter FF Koebel and myself assigned as fire attack. As I looked at the residence I thought we had a small job, room and contents probably. The irony if any is that the owner of the house was a retired volunteer Assistant Chief with our department and had acquired the house from his deceased father who was the Chief many years ago.

FF Koebel and myself advanced a hand line to side C as directed by the Battalion Chief for the best access. We had full turnout gear with Scott 2.2 SCBA's and made entry via a door forced by the police prior to our arrival. We encountered moderate smoke conditions and virtually no heat as we began our primary search. The Division Chief of Prevention (Chief Lamons) had arrived and made a tour of the exterior observing fire presenting in a window on the first floor of side 2. Chief Lamons requested a face-to-face conference with me at my entry point so he could give clear directions as to the location of the fire.

With the information Chief Lamons passed, ,FF Koebel and I made quick progress to what was thought to be the seat of the fire. As is my normal procedure, I was leading the way, this is something I feel strongly about as I can evaluate conditions and adjust accordingly. I entered a narrow hallway and confronted fire in a room just ahead. FF Koebel passed the nozzle to me, as there was only enough width for one person, and I hit the fire knocking it down. We agreed on the need for overhaul in that room, and again due to the confines of the hall, FF Koebel and I exchanged places so I could give a report to command as he moved in to start overhaul.

We exchanged places in a larger room adjacent to the narrow hallway. As we began moving back down the hallway the floor partially collapsed with no warning. I had been in that exact area just seconds before the accident and there was no indication of weakness. FF Koebel dropped to the basement floor along with the nozzle while I went in to my waist. I was able to back fully out of the hole and I yelled to FF Koebel, finding him to be uninjured and mobile. I instructed him to remain where he was while I requested help.

After broadcasting emergency radio traffic requesting assistance I refocused on FF Koebel. Still speaking to him I was able to reach through the hole and hold his hand. The smoke and heat were increasing so FF Koebel dropped to the floor and used the hand line for protection. About this time he indicated that his air supply was getting low. I radioed a request for additional air cylinders and while it seemed like an eternity I realized something had to be done now.

I removed my SCBA quickly, however it became entangled in debris or furniture. As I struggled to get the SCBA to FF Koebel I was rapidly becoming overcome by smoke. At this time the first rescue crew joined me and as one of the guys removed me, the other two continued to fight for FF Koebel's life. I spent the remainder of the incident in the care of EMS refusing to leave until FF Koebel was out.

The facts found after the fire showed a long burning fire originating in the basement. Due to balloon frame construction it had gained purchase in the walls. There was also a large difference between FF Koebels' physique and my own, I tipped the scales at 180 while he was upwards of 250 pounds.

I am not fully aware of the remainder of events and now will defer to Captain Brian Spini.

Captain Brian Spini

I was a Firefighter assigned to Quint 252 at the time of the Lamar street fire. Our crew was the third unit on the scene. We were a five-person crew, which was split into two crews a lot of the time. This day was no different, LT. Cravens, FF Bradley and myself were assigned first floor search. A.O. Burrows and FF O'Leary were assigned to the second floor to assist Engine 231. As we made entry into the first floor, we went to our left; this was uncommon we almost always went to the right. Had we gone to the right this day, we would have fallen through the floor before Don did. The main seat of the fire was just to the right of the front door in the basement. Very soon into the fire, this floor collapsed.

Shortly after making entry, we were pushed out of the house by heat and smoke. The entire house charged changed in an instant. I personally feel this was the time Don went through the floor. I remember getting outside and looking back to see heavy smoke now coming from the front door; I felt we had just lost all our second floor crews. We grabbed a line and started back towards the house to get our crews out; at that time, we saw all of the crews come falling out of the front door. Then, we heard the call from Capt. Harper.

Our crew went to the door on side C of the structure and made entry following Capt. Harper's line to the point where Don had fallen through the floor. The conditions were getting worse in the structure. We found Capt. Harper starting to be overcome by smoke, and we relayed him out into the yard of side C. FF Bradley was now at the hole trying to get the SCBA pushed through to Don. I must tell you, FF Bradley was and still is an extremely powerful man, and he could not get this SCBA through a hole that a 300-pound man had just fallen through. When Don went through the floor it came back up, leaving a very small opening with jagged edges. After several attempts with the SCBA, FF Bradley reached through the hole and told Don to “grab my hand.” Don replied, “I can't reach it.” The reply was spoken in a very clear voice as if he no longer had his mask on. This was to be the last contact we had with Don Koebel.

The fire conditions in the structure were worsening, and a basement access on side two was discovered. We left the hole and all gathered at the exterior basement. Sadly, we ran right by this exterior basement door on our way to help Capt. Harper and Don. Personally, I feel this was a critical mistake.

From that point, things seemed to get more chaotic. People were making entry into the basement on low air. FF O'Leary actually found Don; before he could do anything, someone pulled him out of the basement thinking he was Don. There was a growing number of people gathering at the basement door, and it appeared that no one could keep track of who was in the basement at any given time. Everyone wanted to go to the aid of his colleague, and for a while, all self-discipline was gone. Roughly twenty (20) minutes after we lost contact with Don, Engine 23 and a mutual aid crew pulled him from the basement. Sadly, he was pronounced dead at a local hospital.

Everyone needs to realize this can happen anywhere. We were not prepared to save one of our own. We acted and performed to the level to which we were trained. In retrospect, several things come to mind, which could have made a difference. First, had a 360° walk-around been done prior to making entry, it is possible that we would have attacked this fire differently. Also, had we known about Rapid Intervention and done a 360 as a RIT, we would have gone right to the exterior basement door as soon as Don went through. I believe Don could have walked right out of the basement if we had found that door earlier in the incident.

We had PASS devises, but Don never activated his. I wish one of us had thrown one of ours in the hole to aid in finding Don faster. The use of a Mayday policy would have been nice. There was some delay in the radio traffic. A Mayday policy would have made a big difference.

Consolidated Fire District 2 has done several things to help prevent this from ever happening again. We have done some very extensive Rapid Intervention training and will continue to do so. We have taken the lead in getting a county-wide Mayday Policy adopted. And we have finally come out of our shells to share with others the mistakes that were made that day.

Please heed our warning, and prepare your department for the worse. This can happen anywhere. If you are not trained in RIT, then get trained. If you don't use a Mayday policy, you need to implement one. This training must be continuous. One little class on the RIT concept won't cut it. You must train and train hard. If your personnel can't get it right, then make them do it until they can. When it comes time to save one of your own, you had better have your stuff together, from the Commander down to the Firefighter. I personally feel that Don did not have to die that March day; we were not trained to save him!

I do have to leave you with this. I have been pretty hard on us as a department in this article, and I feel I need to mention that I saw some of the most heroic actions that day. People completely put their own well being aside to go to the aid of their college. This tragedy was no one's fault; we simply weren't prepared for it. We all preformed to our training level.

An hour prior to that call on March 8, Don drew a picture on Station Two's dry erase board. Luckily, we didn't erase it, and it now hangs framed in station two as a simple reminder how quickly our lives can change. I drive by the Lamar house almost every shift, and I go to sleep every night thinking of that tragic day. I can't help but feel very guilty for Don's death. Running by that basement door will haunt me forever. Please prepare yourselves and don't let Don's death be for nothing.

Check Back soon as Brain will update us on how this changed his Department and how they operqte today some thirteen years later